Insight introduction earlier version
Archival Number: A397
Author: Lonergan, B.
Noteworthy items are as follows:
pt xvii, line 4 of text (ts 1): ts originally read: still it is to be treated only incidentally schematically and incompletely because our primary concern is with the nature of knowing as a discriminant or determinant of cognitive acts.
pt xvii, between first two paragraphs (ts 1): The following paragraph originally between these two, but crossed out by hand: `To expand each of these disjunctions in turn, we may begin by noting that the question whether there is knowldge can be no more significant than the least significant item element in the whole of knowledge.
pt xvii, line -8 (ts 2): ts has `approximate to the facts'
pt xviii, line 2 (ts 2): ts has `... is so extensive that it is divided it mocks'
pt xviii, line 7 (ts 2): ts has `... impossible, if not for the reader, at least'
pt xviii, line 10 (ts 3): ts has `... but the knowing. In the known there are strategic instances that will call for careful investigation. But the instances will be strategic precisely in the measure that further instances of mathematical thought, of scientific method, of common sense (procedures, will be seen to add involve no significant additions) procedures, will be seen to advance, not knowledge of knowledge, but knowledge of mathematics, of science, and of the concrete world in which men live.' All of this is crossed out--the section in parentheses first, then the whole of it--and replaced with what is in pt.
pt xviii, line 13 (ts 3): ts has `... competent specialists have labored to select and present serious readers have labored to select ...'
pt xviii, line 18 (ts 3): ts has `... nothing so disorientates a reader than a failure ...' No change indicated.
pt xviii, line 22 (ts 3): ts has `On a primary level, ...' No change indicated.
pt xviii, line 24 (ts 3): ts has `On a secondary level, ...' No change indicated.
pt xix, line 5 (ts 4): ts has `the present book is to be would be numbered. Nor is it any secret whether such invitations are accepted helpful or, when helpful, accepted. For winter twilight cannot be ...' No further changes are indicated.
pt xix, line -18 (ts 5): ts has `... abstract properties of human knowing. Just as my words proceed from my conceptual formulations, just as my conceptual formulations proceed from my insights, so too any rader that understands what is said can go beyond the unnoticed fact that he is understs understanding to discover and identify in his present or his pre past experience the occurrence of insights'
pt xix, line -13 (ts 5): ts has `... from the dim world of thought to pulsing the pulsing flow of life.'
pt xix, line -12 (ts 5): ts has no comma after science
pt xix, l. - 10 (ts 5): ts has `but the point to the delineation'
pt xix, line -7 (ts 5): ts has no commas after contrary, here, and elsewhere
pt xx, line 1 (ts 6): ts has `At this point juncture ...'
pt xx, line 2 (ts 6): ts has `... chapters are not taken from do not lie within ...'
pt xx, line 5 (ts 6): ts has seem
pt xx, line 8 (ts 6): ts has `Perhaps the most appropro appropriate answer Perhaps an explanation ...'
pt xx, line 11 (ts 6): ts has `... if one he is to be in a position to pass profit ...' Was he going to write `pass judgment on the book as a whole'?
pt xx, line 18 (ts 6-7): ts has `as seems clear, there can be attached, more easily than not, it is both easy ...'
pt xx, line 20 (ts 7): the words `of our awareness' are added above the normal line of type, as if BL were going to type `if that account of the levels ...'
pt xx, line -13 (ts 7): ts has `... exactitude is attained. Thus, while I would not only admit but also contend that insights and their accumulation, shifting viewpoints and heuristic procedures, may be illustrated from the ordinary use of intelligence hamed common sense, I also would feel obliged to add For this reason ...'
pt xx, line -9 (ts 7): ts had `must also' with indication by hand to invert order
pt xx, line -8 (ts 7: ts had `happened', changed by hand to `happens'
pt xxi, line 4 (ts 8): ts had `generically' for `generally'; no change indicated
pt xxi, line 12 (ts 8): ts had `... of man. And as the reader ...' And is crossed out by hand, As made upper case, and an indication given that a new paragraph should begin here.
pt xxi, line 14 (ts 8): ts had `... to my account'; changed by hand
pt xxi, line 16 (ts 8): ts has `In earlier periods the thnker that would come to grips with his thinking could appeal to what M. Gilson would call the historical experience of philosophy would call the experiment of history in philosophy, to come to grips with his thinking could appeal be aided ...'
pt xxi, line 22 (ts 8): ts had `... there is at his disposal'; changed by hand
pt xxi, line -12 (ts 9): ts has `a critique of Pure Reason,'
pt xxi, line -11 (ts 9): ts has: `has case a no less momentous shadow, no less ...'
pt xxi, line -10 (ts 9): ts has: `Clearly it would be foolhardy for a contemporary effort to resolve the duality in man's knowledge, to ignore, ...' No change indicated, though the comma after knowledge is added by hand.
pt xxi, last paragraph (ts 9): This paragraph originally began as follows (all crossed out by hand in ts): `But there is also a third purpose that I hope to achieve through an appropriation of the modes of scientific thought. What, in my opinion, was meant originally by the abstraction of form from material conditions, what later Des Descartes later was struggling to convey in his incomplete Regulae ad directionem ingenii, what Kant conceived as a priori synthesis, that the scientist refers to when he affirms his reliance to be placed on scientific method itself rather than on contemporary scientific conclusions, falls into the unity of a single perspective when formulated as heuristic structure.'
pt xxii, line 3 (ts 10): ts has: `... not merely offers a clue but also exhibits an instance of the larger, multiform dynamism that we are seeking to explore for the discovery but also ...'
pt xxii, line -18 (ts 11): ts has: `... with a scrutiny of the mathematical physics. But if I am to avoid a over-statement, I must hasten to add that their significance is psychological rather than logical that the significance ...'
pt xxii, line -1 (ts 11): `personal' is added by hand in ts
pt xxiii, line 3 (ts 11): ts has: `always is tends to be misapprehended ...' `tends to be' is added by hand.
pt xxiii, l. 9 (ts 12): ts has `As has been said'
pt xxiii, line 20 (ts 12): ts has: `A teacher of math geometry ...'
pt xxiv, line 7 (ts 13): ts has comma after and
pt xxiv, line -16 (ts 14): ts has `mathematized'
pt xxiv, line -10 (ts 14): the words `were they' are added in type above the normal line, as if by afterthought--I think they should be removed from UTP edition (RD)
pt xxiv, line -8 (ts 14): ts has `that the that judgment ...' The second `that' is added by hand.
xxiv, line -5 (ts 14): ts has `... to sweep all that has been seen up into ...'
pt xxv, first full paragraph (ts 14): this paragraph began as follows (all crossed out by hand): `Nor is this all, for I have not been able to reach within these pages the ultimate statements that govern the meaning of my last statements'
pt xxv, line 5 (ts 15): ts has `... only in the schematic fashion and incomplete fashion needed that is needed ...'
pt xxv, line 6 (ts 15): the words `affirm the' are added in type above the normal line
pt xxv, l. 11 (ts 15): ts does not have `mathematical'
pt xxv, line -20 (ts 15): ts has `... quite general, it the upper context ...'
pt xxv, line -15 (ts 15): ts has `definitive' for `definite'. No change is indicated.
pt xxv, last paragraph (ts 15): this paragraph originally began as follows (all crossed out by hand in ts): `Now let P denote our initial context in which we assign a meaning to the name, insight. Let Q denote our next context in which we study mathematical insights. Let R denote the subsequent context concerned with the insights'
pt xxv, line -10 (ts 16): ts has `... vast and difficult and subject open to ...' `open' is added by hand.
pt xxv, line -6 (ts 16): ts hasa; `... there also is the noêsis or intentio intendens or pensée pensante that inquires and reflects, understands and affirms, not only the lower contexts, P, Q, R, ... and the upper context that is Gödel's theorem but also its own activity of inquiring and reflecting, understanding and affirming, asking further questions and reaching more nuanced answers. Clearly pensante that is constituted ...'
pt xxvi, line 2 (ts 16): ts has: `... to understand and affirm what it is to understand and affirm, ...' No change indicated.
pt xxvi, line 7 (ts 16): ts has: `... only if the reviser hypothetical reviser ...'
pt xxvi, l. 8 (ts 16): ts has `in the already prescribed manner'
pt xxvi, line 17 (ts 17): ts has: `...endless revision with without implying ...' Change made by hand. Clearly a typo.
pt xxvi, line -13 (ts 17): ts has two attempts beginning at `scheme of things.' Both are crossed out. They are: `scheme of things. Conversely, if the disjunction is to be helpful, it must envisage precisely the points on which logicians or metaphysicians are likely to find it obvious that, on their already established criteria, I must be on the wrong track. So with the more general reader's permission, I now shall depart from the'
and (ts 18): `scheme of things. Accordingly, with the permission of the more general reader, I must depart for the moment from the basic rule of the present work'
pt xxvi, line -6 (ts 18): For the two paragraphs `From a logical viewpoint' and `Secondly, our goal' ts has (without any indication of a change) the following: `From a logical viewpoint, indeed, it might seem that enough has been said. The argument is to move through a sequence of lower contexts for the purpose of reaching an upper context; and the basic upper context is to be pre-logical, not in the sense made current by M. Lévy-Bruhl, but in the sense that developing intelligence and reasonableness are prior to intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed utterances. Still it may not be amiss to indicate a single instance in which the genetic order of developing insights differs from the logical order of defining thought. For Thus, logically it is illegitimate to speak, for example, of the equality of the spokes of a cart-wheel without explaining that by equality one means the spokes will be said to be equal if the same number is reached in measuring each of them. In turn, this statement calls for a further statement in which the meaning of the word, measuring, is sxplained; and that explanation calls for an account of measuring units of measurement, of their standardization, and of the numbers employed in measuring, and of the isomorphism of mathematical and physical relations. On the other hand, from a genetic genetically it seems clear enough that Euclidean geometry existed for some centuries before there occurred any effective advertence to its metrical suppositions. More generally, it seems true that prior to every correct logical formalization there is a sufficiently univocal communication of insights, that this prior communication grounds not only non-technical discourse but also the possibility of discussing the adequacy or inadequacy of any formalization, and that from a pedagogical viewpoint the correct procedure is to begin by communicating the insights.'
pt xxvii (ts 19): The following initial attempts at the paragraph `To turn from' are crossed out in ts:
`To turn from logical the difficulties of logic'
`To turn from possible difficulties of logicians to possible difficulties of metaphysicians'
`To turn from logical to metaphysical considerations, I had best begin by explaining why metaphysicians are likely to find all my arguments upside down and inside out. As Aristotle noted, one may assign either a causa essendi (because the moon is a sphere, it passes through such and such phases) or a causa cognoscendi (because the moon passes through these phases, it must be a sphere). Now this distinction is significant enough to bear the weight of an application on the grand scale that envisages at once the whole of metaphysics. For the whole of metaphysics can be set forth by in terms of the causa essendi and then it begins from the ontological cause of all being and from that gr in terms of that ground and its derivatives explains all else that is or can be. But inverse to every causa essendi, there is a causa cognoscendi. It follows that, if an ontological metaphysics is known, there must be as well an epistemological metaphysics that begins from the cognitional ground of all that is to be known and in terms of that ground explores all that is to be known of every being. The existence of such an epistemological metaphysics might be denied by anyone that denied the existence of an ontological metaphysics. Again, epistemological metaphysics might be rejected by those that 1) admit an ontological metaphysics but 2) deny that either they themselves of anyone else can know how it is that an ontological metaphysics can be known. But, at least, it is impossible to avoid both positivism and irrationalism and yet reject epistemological metaphysics; and the difficulty that, at the moment, I would forestall arises neither from positivists nor irrationalists but from metaphysicians who, I believe, fail to grasp the full implications of their own position.'
pt xxvii, last two paragraphs (ts 20-23): The following appears in ts, without any indication of a change to what is in pt: `To turn from logical to metaphysical considerations, I had best begin by explaining a probable paradox. For I think it likely that I may succeed in persuading some [the word `some' added by hand] positivists of the existence of and validity of metaphysics and yet at the same time, draw from hitherto convinced metaphysicians outraged protests that I have everything upside down and inside out. To elucidate such a bewildering phenomenon, I it will be helpful to recall Aristotle's distinction between the causa essendi (the moon goes through these phases, because it is a sphere) and the causa cognoscendi (the moon is a sphere, because it does through these phases). Now the traditional presentation of metaphysics has been in terms of the causa essendi, and only incidentaly has the inverse relationship of the causa cognoscendi received attention. But in the present work the whole conception of metaphysics is dominated by the causa cognoscendi; and while the labor of writing a supplementary volume would reveal in detail the equivalence of the two presentations, still so great a labor would be superfluous for anyone willing to attend to a rather brief argument.
For it seems demonstrable that, if there exists an ontologically structured metaphysics that grounds all its basic explanations on the causa essendi, then there also exists an epistemologically structured metaphysics that grounds all its basic explanations on the causa cognoscendi.
Let us distinguish between an ontologically structured metaphysics that grounds all its basic explanations
Let us suppose that metaphysics is a science and that a science is certa rerum cognitio per causas. Let us also suppose that there exists an ontologically structured metaphysics, that is, that there is a department of certain knowledge of things in which in all basic instances the ground or cause is a causa essendi. Then either it is or it is not possible to explain how the ontologically structured metaphysics is known. If that explanation is possible, then the ontologically structured metaphysics in its entirety is deducible from a ground or set of grounds that assign the causa cognoscendi ground or set of grounds in which regularly the causa cognoscendi is assigned. So on this first alternative the ontologically structured metaphysics necessarily implies supposes an epistemologically structured metaphysics. But on the second alternative, on which one cannot know how the ontologically structured metaphysics is known, there arises a series of disconcerting questions. For if one cannot know how it is known, then there can be no method of metaphysics; it can be claimed that results are obtained; but it cannot be suggested that anyone can know how to go about obtaining them. Again, if one cannot know how the ontologically structured metaphysics is known, there arises the suspicion that it is not known but merely asserted; for if one cannot know how knowledge is acquired, how can one know that it is possessed. Again, as will appear, it is possible to explain just how mathematics is known, just how natural science is known, just how common sense is developed, just how beliefs are acquired and spread. It follows that the unknowable genesis of ontologically structured metaphysics can have nothing in common with the genesis of mathematics, nothing in common with the genesis of natural science, nothing in common with the genesis of common sense, and nothing in common with the genesis of belief. Indeed, even though mystical knowledge and extra-sensory perception have not been explained, no one claims that they cannot ever be explained; and so it would follow that the unknowable genesis of ontologically structured metaphysics is even more unscrutable than mystical experience and extra-sensory perception.
In brief, while there is a certain novelty to my approach to metaphysics, the novelty lies not in the principle but in the achievement. The notion of the causa cognoscendi is as old as the notion of the causa essendi. If an ontologically structured metaphysics can be known, then the activity of knowing it can be known. If that activity can be known, then the activity supplies a premiss from which the known can be deduced. Though the deduction is new, still only the complacent devotion to a familiar routine Though the deduction is new, still it can be rejected in principle only by affirming in principle that metaphysics cannot be methodical, cannot but be suspect, cannot but be classed as more mysterious than mysticism and extra-sensory perception. Such consequences are no more acceptable to the metaphysicians of the present than to those of the past; and so one is driven to accepting the first alternative, namely, that one cannot affirm an ontologicaly structured metaphysics without supposing (I do not say "without knowing") an epistemologically structured metaphysics in which everything seems may seem, especially to the routine mind, to be inside out and upside down because the argument runs not from the causa essendi but from the causa cognoscendi.'
pt xxviii, line 1 (ts 23): ts has `Our aim, then, regards 1) ...'
pt xxviii, line 14 (ts 23): `and' is added by hand in ts.
pt xxviii, paragraph `The last phrase ...' (ts 23): Two initial attempts at starting this paragraph appear in ts:
`The last phrase may stand as our'
`The last phrase may be taken at once as the principle and the slogan of the effort of these pages: Thoroughly understand understanding, and you wil come to understanding all there is to be'
pt xxviii, line -19 (ts 24): ts has: `... you will possess a base and pattern a fixed base ...'
pt xxviii, line -15 (ts 24): ts has: `... but rather a beginning. It implies a metaphysic that not only unifies the sciences but also relates the sciences to common sense. It implies a method of metaphysics that operates from a universal viewpoint, that makes every other viewpoint intelligible, that embraces every development and reverses every aberration It is a necessary beginning, ...'
pt xxix, line 7 (ts 25): ts has `... is revealed; and that revealed structure proves to be a metaphysics and as that revealed ...'
pt xxix, lines 15 and 16 (ts 25): the words `of the origin' are added by hand in ts.
pt xxix, line -20 (ts 25): ts has `... that arbitrarily brushes questions aside. The issue of transcendent knowledge has to be faced questions aside. But ...' This probably indicates that BL was copying from yet an earlier version.
pt xxix, line -5 (ts 26): ts has: `... its dependences and affiliations, that might be worth tracing recounting. Yet the story would be ambigjous, as long as the prior task remained undone. To it each reader would bring For the prior task is the attainment of the universal viewpoint that potentially includes all viewpoints and of the universal scale that potentially includes all scales of values.ations; they might be ...'
pt xxx, line 8 (ts 27): ts has period after annoyance.
pt xxx, line 10 (ts 27): ts has: `... will reveal, they do not can hardly pretend ...'
pt xxx, paragraph `In the Introduction ...' This is run in with the preceding paragraph in ts, with an indication by hand that a new paragraph should begin here.
pt xxx, line -14 (ts 27): ts has Treatise on Human Nature