Insight Chapter 14
Archival Number: A414
Author: Lonergan, B.
BL's typescript of chapter 14 of Insight. The chapter is entitled `The Dialectic of Philosophy'
Database and descriptions © Copyright 2017 by Robert M. Doran
pt 385, subtitle (ts 1): subtitle in ts is `Ground of the Dialectic'; this is written in hand above a crossed-out `Outline.'
pt 387, l. 5 (ts 4): ts has `dialectic' for `method'
pt 387, l. 15 (ts 4): crossed out in ts:
`The dialectic may be characterized by a central strand of direct development and by complementary branches of indirect progress. The central strand consists in a series of clarifications of knowledge and of its implications in the realms of metaphysics, ethics, and natural theology. The complementary branches have a twofold origin; partly they spring from the incompleteness of the central clarifications at any moment of human history, and so they appear as efforts for still further progress; but at the same time and to a greater or less extent they are involved in the polymorphism of the subject, and so either they are strengthening a mistaken cause by appealing to mistaken notions of the self, of being, or of objectivity, or else they are refuting these mistakes under the mistaken impression that they are refuting all that can be meant by the self, by being, or by objectivity.'
The reverse of the next page shows that the following also was written and rejected:
`The possibility of contradictory contributions to a single goal rests on two sets of conditions. The first set regards the process of contributing and, as it is more complex, it will be postponed for a moment. The second set regards'
pt 388, l. 6 (ts 6): ts has `or' for `and'
pt 388, par. `Fourthly' (ts 6): This paragraph originally read: `Fourthly, the internal coherence of a philosophy forces all its epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and theological pronouncements into line with its adoption of basic positions or, alternatively, of basic counter-positions.' This is crossed out in ts.
pt 389, l. 10 (ts 7): ts: `... in anyone's thought. Thus, for Hume, knowledge was simply a matter of impressions linked by beliefs and habits thought. Thus, Hobbes ...'
pt 389, par. `In the light' (ts 8): The following paragraph is crossed out:
`In the light of the dialectic, then, all philosophic pronouncements divide into positions and counter-positions. Positions sub-divide into a historical sequence, and later positions are developments of earlier positions. However, a development of man's knowledge of knowledge and of its implications can be expressed in a counter-position; one can make a significant discovery without being a completely successful philosopher. Accordingly, there also is a historical series of groups of counter-positions. Still, this series cannot be regarded as a single cumulative development. What is found is a discontinuous set of initial counter-positions, each of which begins by enjoying a coherent internal expansion but ends with its reversal into a position.'
pt 389, l. - 3 (ts 9): ts: `This presupposition merits exploration, and the rest of the present chapter will be devoted to indicating, in a manner that perhaps is sufficient for present purposes, the general strategy by which one can proceed from the cognitional theory that we have been formulating to a metaphysics thatmay claim to possess a remarkable resemblance to continuity with views almost as old as philosophy itself. exploration. In the present chapter ...'
pt 390, l. - 22 (ts 10) ts has `principles'
pt 391, l. 9 (ts 11): the following is crossed out:
`Such is the general idea of metaphysics, at least as we propose to conceive it; and there seems little profit in discussing other ideas at the moment. Rather let us distinguish between a latent metaphysics, which tends to be common to all men, and the explicit metaphysics, over which disputes arise. Latent metaphysics consists in the universalist dynamism that is immanent and operation in knowledge'
pt 393, l. - 15 (ts 15): ts has `not' for `neither'
pt 397, l. 13 (ts 21): ts: `People as they are cannot avoid ...'
pt 399, l. - 17 (ts 25): ts: `... so his advertence to his detached and disinterested desire to know and the immanent structure ...'
pt 400, par. Fifthly (ts 26): other attempts at this paragraph:
`Fifthly, this use of the above premisses effects a transition from a latent to an explicit metaphysics. For latent metaphysics lies in scientific knowledge and common sense. Their reorientation frees them from the counter-positions in which the negation of metaphysics is latent
in scientific knowledge and in common sense there are latent both metaphysics and the negation of metaphysics. The reorientation of science and common sense eliminates the counter-positions in which the negation of metaphysics is latent and it leaves the positions that have to be brought to light
metaphysics is latent inasmuch as cognitional activity operates within heuristic structures towards goals that are isomorphic with the structure
pt 401, l. 1 (ts 27): ts has `will result in setting one's aim too high'
pt 401, par. `Finally' is run into preceding
pt 401, l. 6 (ts 28): ts does not have `may'
pt 401, l. 8 (ts 28): ts: `takes on the appearance' for `risks taking on the appearance'
pt 401, par `To recapitulate': ts had the start of another paragraph at this point: `The foregoing positive characterization of our method must now be complemented by a negative statement of what our method neither is nor pretends to be'
pt 401, l. 16 (ts 28): ts: `... self-affirmation. Thenceforward, the method consists in directives issued by the subject to himself in pursuit of a goal that begins to be sought explicitly Such self-affirmation...'
pt 402, end of first full paragraph (ts 31): ts has another paragraph in this subsection, crossed out:
`The basic alternatives seem to be 1) automatic methods, 2) guiding methods, and 3) compound methods. Automatic methods regard metaphysical systems as expressed. Such systems consist in sets of propositions. The propositions can be divided into conclusions, that can be deduced from other propositions in the set, and principles, that are premisses but not conclusions. If the principles are regarded as self-evident and the deductions are necessary, then the method is automatic. It does not deny the relevance of subjects to whom the principles are self-evident and whom the conclusions are necessary, but its claim is to exert an objective compulsion that can be avoided by subjects only through a lapse in intellectual probity.'
pt 402, l. 8 (ts 30): ts has `differences'
pt 403, l. - 15 (ts 33): ts has `through a concrete judgment of fact'
pt 404, par `The alternative' (ts 34): Earlier start on the paragraph: `The alternative to deducing one's metaphysics from abstract truths'
pt 404, par. `However' (ts 35): The following paragraph is crossed out at this point:
`Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to see how one is to justify one's choice of concrete deduction as the method of metaphysics. For it is the function of metaphysics to ascertain the general nature or structure of the universe. But before one can assert to employ concrete deduction as one's But to decide to employ concrete deduction as one's method If one chooses to name metaphysics the execution of a concrete deduction, then clearly there is needed some prior science that determines whether or not the existing universe is locked in the embrace of a syllogistic system. Nor is it clear, at first sight, that the prior science in question can be itself a concrete deduction.'
pt 405, l. 16 (ts 36): ts: `For the analytic propositions that are equally relevant to every possible universe lack both relevance and significance: they lack relevance, for ...'
pt 405, l. - 1 (ts 37): ts: `none of which are certain'
pt 406, l. 5 (ts 38): ts: `Every insight is an a priori synthesis;'
pt 407, footnote (ts 39): ts has this in the text, but square brackets are added around it by hand; ms B had the same in round brackets (typed), and a handwritten marginal note indicates `footnote.'
pt 407, l. 4 (ts 39): ts: `prior to the judgment'
pt 407, l. - 8 (ts 40): ts: `... in metaphysical terms; his writings, I believe, contain a sufficient number of indications and suggestions to guide the construction of an adequate account of the third and needed form of wisdom; but it seems hopeless to expect that any construction will be accepted generally, until the polymorphism of human consciousness is accepted generally; and that acceptance and one cannot ...'
pt 407, l. - 1 (ts 41): ts: `640 pages'
pt 409, par `Fourthly' (ts 43): ts had an earlier start on this par., crossed out: `Fourthly, analytic propositions will survive but not analytic principles. For analytic propositions rest on rules of syntax and on definitions of terms; such rules and definitions are matters of convention or of supposition; they are indubitable because doubting becomes possible only after the question for reflection arises and there is no question for reflection that arises from the mere convention or the mere supposition but a convention or supposition excludes the question for reflection; and doubt becomes possible only after the question for reflection. Thus, if I suppose you suppose that A is B, and I ask whether A really is B, you will point out that you are merely supposing and that my question puts an end to supposing'
pt 409, l. - 13 (ts 44): ts: `subject as prior'
pt 409, par. `Sixthly' (ts 44): earlier start on this paragraph crossed out: `Sixthly, an acceptance of the criterion of indubitability does not survive its application.'
pt 410, l. 3 (ts 44): ts: `... that in fact is true. But a criterion that can lead to mistakes is not an indubitable criterion true. But ...'
pt 410, l. - 20 (ts 45): ts: `and, as well, it casts suspicion on the assumption that their disagreements stem from ...'
pt 410, par. `Eighthly' (ts 45): ts has earlier start, crossed out: `Eighthly, the foregoing account of the consequences of universal doubt is not indubitable. For it presupposes our account of the structure of human knowledge and of the polymorphism that besets human consciousness. Such an account cannot claim to be more than what in fact is true. It follows that to'
pt 411, l. 4 (ts 46): ts: `... far from being indubitable; at the same time, the arbitrariness, with which the doubt is applied, will fail to touch leave standing one's own rooted convictions and as the same time ...'
pt 411, l. - 18 (ts 47): ts: `... the universe, to admit no concealed presuppositions to assign a clear ...'
pt 412, l. 11 (ts 48): ts: `... what he knows in judgment is not some element or aspect of the concrete universe of being but rather a component in the "already out there now real." known in judgment and ...'
pt 413, l. - 18 (ts 50): ts: `... matter in motion. To save spiritual reality To convert material reality into spiritual, the Cambridge Platonists tended to identify space with divine omnipresence and time with divine eternity motion. The Cambridge ...'
pt 413, l. - 12 (ts 51): ts: `... appearance; the realities, then, were God and the soul with God producing appearances and the soul perceiving appearances being then was ...'
pt 413, par. `If it is ...' (ts 51): An earlier start: `Kant's Copernican revolution was a half-hearted affair. He broke with the identification of objectivity with extroversion to the extent that he regarded both primary and secondary qualities as phenomena and that he pronounced the things themselves of Newtonian thought to be unknowable.'
pt 414, l. - 17 (ts 52): ts: `... subsequent thought. Cartesian dualism was surmounted by denying the name of knowledge to elementary extroversion and, no less, to the intelligent and reasonable affirmation of what is.
pt 414, l. - 5 (ts 53): ts: `... both types of realism and invited the impressive expansion of speculative ingenuity that we witness in German idealism. So one anomaly breeds another and, if nothing is more alien to the content of idealism than mere extroverted consciousness, still nothing is more relevant to an understanding of is genesis. There followed the impressive expansion of speculative ingenuity witnessed in German idealism and so, as one anomaly breeds another, nothing is more alien to the content or more relevant to the genesis of idealism than extroverted animal consciousness. The older ...'
pt 416, l. 21 (ts 56): ts: `That assumption obviously is false, for not one admits that stupidity and silliness for if one ...'
pt 416, l. - 12 (ts 56): ts: `If it rarely is adopted by original thinkers, it is far from unimportant for overtly and, more commonly, covertly it is the method that is assumed without scrutiny by the majority of students and professors, of critics and historians rarely is ...'
pt 416, l. - 9 (ts 56): ts: `and, indeed perhaps, the majority more than a negligible minority of students and professors, of critics and historians, never wander very far ...' The change to what appears in pt was made by hand in ms B.
pt 416, l. - 6 (ts 56): ts: a variable.
pt 417, l. 8 (ts 57): ts: `are denied'
pt 418, l. 10 (ts 59): ts: `were' for `was'
pt 419, par. `The fallacy' (ts 61): ts had an earlier start on the `Fifthly' paragraph here: `Fifthly, common sense eclecticism blocks the way to a necessary criticism of common sense. For that criticism supposes a distinction between different orientations of human consciousness and an accurate analysis of the structure and pattern of experience in its intellectual form. Neither the distinction nor the analysis can be reached by modestly disclaiming any effort to understand mathematics, science, common sense, and philosophy and by proceeding to erect into sound philosophy a list of the truths that one must regard as inevitable or certain. For if the list contains the truth that common sense needs to be criticized and, so far from settling the aims and'
pt 421, sec. 4.5 (ts 63): L had originally begun a section on Science as Philosophy:
`4.5 Science as Philosophy
`Until philosophy attains a method, defines its field accurately, acknowledges its own limitations, and reveals itself competent to advance in the solution of its proper problems, it will be inevitable that mathematicians and empirical scientists'
pt 421, sec. 4.5 (ts 64): the subheading is simply `Dialectic'; so too in ms B
pt 422, l. 7 (ts 65): ts: `... into the concept, while we regard ...'
pt 423, l. 15 (ts 67): ts: `realism of the res extensa et talis for animal knowing ...'
pt 423, l. - 17 (ts 67): ts: `enables to eliminate'
pt 424, par. `In the past' (ts 68): two starts on this paragraph:
`The cheapest way to satisfy the philosophic appetite of scientists is by a scientific monism. To be a philosopher is simply to master all the sciences. For
`The most expeditious way to satisfy the philosophic appetite of scientists seems to have been a scientific monism.
pt 424, l. 7 (ts 69): ts: `was sasisfied commonly enough with a scientific monism.'
pt 424, l. - 13 (ts 69): ts: `... doubt science, and so doubters were summoned to show which of the conclusions of the sciences were mistaken. the validity ...'
pt 424, l. - 7 (ts 70): ts had `personal loyalty to' for `involvement in'
pt 425, l. - 10 (ts 71): ts: `... success or failure of a particular philosophy. The reason for this difference is that scientific method is of far greater generality than any scientific theory, so that the same method can lead successively to an indefinite series of different theories; but philosophic method stands on the same level of generality as philosophy itself, and so it is related to philosophy, not as a genetic universal to generated particulars, but as the genesis of an all-inclusive view to the attainment of an all-inclusive view. failure of ...'
pt 425, l. - 7 (ts 72): ts: `Now there is no use disputing about names, but there is a point ...'
pt 426, l. 4 (ts 72): ts: `and so there is ...'
pt 426, par. `Accordingly' run into preceding
pt 427, par. `Finally' run into preceding
pt 427, l. 17 (ts 74): ts: `... equivocations; nor is there any probability, as long as there is any question about the one and only key to philosophy, that philosophers can engage fruitfully in anything except the preliminary task. and as the preliminary task has to be and as the performance ...'
pt 427, par. `A third' (ts 75): ts had another start of this paragraph: `In the third place, the scientist is repelled by the mental attitude of the philosopher.' Crossed out.
pt 428, l. 1 (ts 75): par. `Now' run into preceding. Same with par. `The theoretical'
pt 428, l. 16 (ts 76): ts: `... is to convince him how reasonably he may rely on part results; since, where they are mistaken for class demonstrations and his own work in the laboratory make him familiar with the rigor of the methods that have been employed reasonably he may rely
pt 428, l. - 12 (ts 77): ts: `from the days, it seems,'
pt 429, par. `It follows' run into preceding
pt 429, l. - 14 (ts 78): ts: `... turning to philosophy is, perhaps, most likely to overlook. An awareness of the development of one's own understanding reveals at once that a symbolically formalized logic can represent only the pauses in development, and that every further insight only the pauses in the course of development could be represented by a symbolically formalized logical statement and that every fresh insight would demand a restatement is, perhaps, ...'
pt 430, l. -2 (ts 79): ts: `a unique ability to supply philosophy with the secondary minor premisses supply philosophy ...'