Insight Chapter 16
Archival Number: A416
Author: Lonergan, B.
BL's typescript of chapter 16 of Insight. Running heads on all but the first page indicate that this material was once titled `Deepening of Metaphysics.'
Database and descriptions © Copyright 2017 by Robert M. Doran
pt 488, l. - 18 (ts 1): ts: `in a unified knowledge,'; this is changed in ms B
pt 489, l. 18 (ts 2): ts: ts had `reach' and `reaching' for `posit' and `positing'; changed by hand
pt 490, par. `In any pair': ts had `opposite' each time for `converse'; this was changed in ms B
pt 491, l. 3 (ts 4): ts had another start on this par., crossed out: `When P and Q are both real and really distinct, relations between them may be merely supposed and so notional.'
pt 491, l. - 18 (ts 5): ts had `contingent' for `non-systematic'; changed by hand
pt 491, l. - 15 (ts 5): ts: `... fix the relations and the relations fix the terms. It is clear enough that one cannot speak of a proportion without supposing the notion of quantity relations fix ...'
pt 491, l. - 8 (ts 6): ts had `that it separates the necessary and the contingent'; changed by hand; so too with 491, ll. 1-2
pt 492, l. - 4 (ts 7): ts: `nor the relations without the terms. Yet to specify in full the central and conjugate without the terms ...'
pt 494, par. `Accordingly' (ts 10): earlier start, crossed out: `Accordingly, we are led to the conclusion that in concrete relations the component of primary relativity is indeed internal'
pt 494, l. - 8 (ts 10): ts: `Aquinas affirmed both even though his commentators are unwilling to take his statements as he made them. Still, how can P acquire a real relation of equality and not acquire any new reality? The only possible answer is that P all along had the reality of the real relation and that the change in Q merely provided it with its external term both. Nor did he lack a reason. P can ...'
pt 495, l. - 14 (ts 11): ts: `... determinations are found not only in P but also in Q, the determinate proportion of P to Q can change without any change in P. are found ...'
pt 497, l. - 3 (ts 16): ts: `they arise from understanding understanding'
pt 499, par. `A first point' (ts 18): ts had earlier start on this par., crossed out: `A first point, then, is that intelligibility is not extrinsic but intrinsic to being. For what do we mean by being? It is the objective of the pure desire to know; it is what intelligent inquiry and critical reflection strive for; it is whatever is to be grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably. It may be said that these definitions are extrinsic, that they rest not on knowledge of being but on anticipations about it. But while this contention is true, it is not the whole truth. For if being did not have an intelligibility of its own, there would be no prospect of coming to know it by yielding to the desires and norms of intelligence. Nor does this consideration merely present the dilemma, Either admit being to be intrinsically intelligible or else renounce any hope of knowledge. For one does not possess two notions of being, first a notion of whatever is to be grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably and, secondly, a notion of some unknown'
pt 499, l. - 1 (ts 19): ts had `the position of being'
pt 500, l. 5 (ts 20): ts: `... view. But such subjective accidents are irrelevant to the determination of the notion of being and of its implications But once ...'
pt 502, subheading: this subheading originally was `Metaphysical and Logical Analysis'; changed in ts
pt 503, par. `Thirdly' (ts 24): ts has earlier start, crossed out: `Thirdly, then, since metaphysical analysis has a radically different basis from grammatical and logical analysis, one must not expect any one-to-one correspondence between metaphysical elements and grammatical or logical elements.'
pt 503, l. - 5 (ts 26): ts: `there also will be found that some measure of ignorance is taking cover'
pt 505, par. `Such blind' (ts 28): earlier start, crossed out: `It will be objected that the rule of explanatory formulation cannot be observed until science has reached the goal of a complete explanation of all phenomena. The objection would be valid'
pt 505, par. `The foregoing' (ts 29): earlier start, crossed out: `The ultimate ground of the rule of structural transposition is, of course, the difference between metaphysical'
pt 507, l. 13 (ts 31): ts does not have `mean'; changed only with 2nd ed.
pt 507, l. - 2 (ts 32): `bought'--surely this is what belongs here: bought at the price
pt 509, par. `Finally' (ts 34, reverse): earlier start: `Finally, besides its significance as a technique Only a critical metaphysics that envisages at once being and'
pt 509, l. - 14 (ts 35): ts: `and seek their answers'
pt 510, l. 6 (ts 35): ts: `... fields of inter-relations, gravitational and electo-magnetic, of gravitational and electro-magnetic inter-relations, of chemical affinities, of ontogenetic and phylogenetic sequences correlated with successive environments, of psychic inter-subjectivity, and finally of the intellectual grasp that correlates man with the universe as a whole. that confronts man with the universe and invites him to operate'
pt 510, l. 9 (ts 36): ts: `coincidental for successive levels of forms and schemes to bring under'
pt 510, l. - 16 (ts 36): ts: `the relations of the universe and his rational'
pt 510, l. - 3: ts: `arise'
pt 512, l. - 19 (ts 39): ts: `experience'
pt 512, par. `There remain' (ts 39): earlier start, crossed out: `There remain the difficulties of the imagination. Concrete beings can be imagined because they can stand in concrete relations to our senses and our imaginations. Still, inasmuch as they are being imagined, they are not being explained, for explanation regards things in their relations not to our senses but to one another and it embraces under its'
pt 512, l. - 7 (ts 40): ts: `... and act, so too we are helped by imagining the being that is constituted by them and, no less, its immanent constituents so too ...'
pt 514, l. - 9 (ts 43): ts: `nor described'
pt 515, par. `Now if we go ...' (ts 44): earlier start, crossed out: `Presently, we shall have to scrutinize more closely the notion of will and willing. But enough, perhaps, has been said already to indicate accurately the point where the antithesis between material and spiritual arises. For the material primarily is the merely empirical residue and secondarily all that is conditioned in its intrinsic constitution by the merely empirical residue. Complete explanation of all phenomena would result from perfect understanding; yet perfect understanding of the data of our experience necessarily abstracts from individuality,'
pt 515, l. - 18 (ts 44): and this differs from the former enormously.'
pt 516, l. 5: ts: `existences'
pt 517, l. 13 (ts 47): ts: `... apart from the empirical residue, from manifolds of instances in a space-time continuum in actual frequencies that ...'
pt 517, l. - 14 (ts 47): ts: `intrinsically by the empirical residue. Clearly, if inquiry, insight, conception, critical reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment occurred with any actual frequency in particular places and times, empirical residue.'
pt 518, par. `Man' (ts 49): earlier start, crossed out: `Man, then, is individual by his central potency, one by his central form, existent by his central act, and differentiated by physical, chemical, organic, sensitive, and intellectual conjugates. But while his other conjugates are material, his intellectual conjugates are spiritual. His intellectual habits and acts, while they spontaneously and unconsciously provide a higher system for his sensitive living As appears in the various patterns of experience, intellectual habits and acts spontaneously and unconsciously provide a higher system for otherwise coincidental manifolds of sensitive acts. But the primary concern and objective of intellectual activities are centred, not in one's own sensitive acts, but in the contents of those acts, and not in those contents as one's own, but in them as the materials from which intelligence generates knowledge of the'
pt 518, l. - 11 (ts 50): ts: `ground in his central form. This fact draws attention to a fresh problem, for how can the same central form be the principle of unity in conjugates of which some are material and others spiritual? For the central form is differentiated by the conjugates which it unites, nor is this simpy a rule of speech, for it means that we know what the central form is by knowing what the conjugates are. What then is man's central form? Is it material or spiritual? Is it both or is it neither? in his central form.'
pt 518, last sentence (ts 50): ts had earlier form: `But are we to say that man's central form is material because by it man has sensitive experience? Or are we to say that it is spiritual because by it man inquires and understands, reflects and grasps the unconditioned?'
pt 522, l. - 7 (ts 55): ts: `builds upon it. As the empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious subject cannot avoid successfully the affirmation upon it.'
pt 524, l. - 15 (ts 58): ts: `It divides such anticipations into coherent positions, that admit development, and incoherent counter-positions, that invite reversal, and empty assertions cipations ...'
pt 524, l. - 8 (ts 59): ts: `... either to actual explanation of proportionate being or to the anticipated structure of proportionate being as explained or not; moreover, the reference to the anticipated structure either has a factual premiss in the structure of our knowing or not, and either it is formulated coherently the anticipated ...'
pt 525, l. 6 (ts 59): ts: `... valid metaphysical assertions from empty assertions and counter-positions. The disputant may deny that these disjunctions serve to define the statements ...'
pt 526, l. 1 (ts 61): ts: `in the long run they are ineffectual; they never initiate; they never lead; they never are more than the inertial coefficient of the realm of mind and with impressive partiality they resist change from what happens to be familiar to what happens to be unfamiliar
the realm of mind. For their genuine concern is neither truth nor falsity
the realm of mind, for they are indifferent to truth and falsity, and concerned only with the familiar, which they strive to maintain, and with the unfamiliar, which they strive to oppose. Accordingly, since the unfamiliar becomes familiar with the mere passage of time...long run they are negligible; ...'
pt 526, par. `As in' (ts 62): earlier starts crossed out: `Method in metaphysics cannot be more efficacious than method in the natural sciences
`Just as the function of method in the natural sciences is to secure a firm orientation and a tendency that in the long run is efficacious, so also in metaphysics'
pt 526, l. - 3 (ts 63): ts has `rose'
pt 527, l. 15 (ts 64): ts: `Finally, this distinction between reason and faith with its implication of a distinction between philosophy and theology and with its consequent exigence
despite the reactionary noise of a John Peckham, despite ...'
pt 527, l. 11 (ts 64): ts: `... erection within theological schools of distinct and subordinate departments of philosophy and of science. Rather it is an invitation to human reason to grow in consciousness of its native power, to work out its proper procedures and methods, to operate of distinct ...'
pt 529, l. 4 (ts 66): ts: `problem that is the situation in which you exist and I exist. is our existential situation, and yours no less than mine. The confusion and chaos that surrounds us must be met with a human utterance of the transforming word, Let there be light. Let the dominion of the detached and disinterested desire to know be acknowledged. Let the full meaning of that desire be grasped'