Insight Chapter 20
Sku: 42000DTE050
Archival Number: A420
Author: Lonergan, B.
Language(s): English
Decade: 1950
Open 42000DTE050.pdf
Description:
BL's typescript of chapter 20
Database and descriptions © Copyright 2017 by Robert M. Doran
Transcription:
pt 687: the paragraphs `To these main topics,' `The relation,' do not appear in ts. (nor in ms b)
pt 690, l. - 19 (ts 5): ts has `to an X which we names Cosmopolis, and indicated'; changed by hand in ms B.
pt 690, par However is run into preceding in ts; changed in ms B
pt 691, l. - 18 (ts 7): ts: `... that disagree, unless they once they cease to believe ...'; changed by hand in B
pt 692, l. - 22 (ts 8): ts: `it also is ...'
pt 692, l. - 14 (ts 9): ts has colon after self-consciousness
pt 692, l. - 4 (ts 9): ts has `not all what necessarily is so ...' This is changed by hand in ms B, but perhaps mistakenly.
pt 694, l. 13 (ts 11): ts has `won't' for `will not'
pt 694, l. 20 (ts 12): ts: `It also is ...'
pt 694, l. - 4 (ts 12): ts: `for they prescind from a further component that is relevant to the issue and exists.
In the third place, a solution can exist because God is an unrestricted and omnipotent act of understanding; and a solution does exist because God is good. But if the ground of the actuality of a solution implies only one solution from a further ...'
pt 696, l. 1 (ts 14): ts: `by no means is opposed'
pt 696, l. 17 (ts 15): ts: `For even when such a structure fails to determine a single answer, at least it serves to eliminate many mistaken approaches and views, to simplify and order the observation of matters of fact, and through the appeal to ordered facts to facilitate a conclusion based on the combination of the facts with the alternatives to determine ...'
pt 697, par. Tenthly (ts 17): ts has a start, crossed out: `Tenthly, since the actual order of the universe is an emergent probability and since the solution is its'
pt 698, par. Twelfthly (ts 18): ts has a start, crossed out: `Twelfthly, it follows that a distinction has to be drawn between the realization of the full solution and, on the other hand, the emergent trend that prepares the way for its realization. For the full solution meets the full problem in a manner that is both universally accessible and permanent. But the full problem not only takes one to the roots of man's spiritual activities but also manifests itself in the full range of his social, practical, and cultural activities.
its realization. For there are stages in the course of human development in which there is no probability that men should intelligently and rationally apprehend and consent to a universally accessible and permanent solution that meets a problem'
pt 698, par. In the thirteenth place (ts 19): ts has a start, crossed out: `In the thirteenth place, then, the appropriate habitual willingness is some type of charity. For good will matches the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire of intellect for complete understanding. Again, good will is at one with the purposes of the universe and, as has been seen, everything and every tendency and every event is for the realization of the actual order of the unverse, and that order is a manifestation of the completeness of the intelligibility, of the power of the reality, and of the perfection of the goodness and love of God. Good will, then, loves God above all. It is rational self-consciousness, not merely resigning itself to an order that is achieved through good will and dialectically reinforced through bad will, but positively and explicitly engaging and committing itself in an unrestricted love of absolute goodness. It is'
pt 698, l. - 5 (ts 20): ts: `that all their spontaneous ...'; changed in ms B
pt 700, par. Finally (ts 23-24): ts has two starts, crossed out:
`Again, self-sacrificing, repentent [sic], sorrowful love of God and of one'g neighbour is zealous. For both God and one's neighbour are loved through acts that occur within the order of the universe and promote its realization. But that order is dynamic: as emergent probability, it rises above past achievements; as genetic, it develops generic potentialities to their specific perfection; as dialectical, it overcomes evil both by meeting it with good and by using it to reinforce the good. Now a love that embraces the order of the universe and operates in and through
`Finally, self-sacrificing, repentent, sorrowful love of God and of one's neighbour is joyful, dynamic, zealous. For it operates in and through the order of the universe; and that order ever presses forward with a stange, expectant joy. As emergent probability, it rises above past achievement. As genetic, it develops generic potentiality to its specific perfection. As dialectical, it overcomes evil both by meeting it with good and by using it to reinforce the good. But good will finds itself and the universe in love with God'
pt 701, l. 5 (ts 24): ts: `... dominant in cognitional operations. But against this domination there blindly struggle and attached and interested desires of man's sensitivity and intersubjectivity. Moreover, bad will not only fails to follow intellect but also reinforces the desires that compete with the desire of intellect. It follows that good will not only will match the pure desire's detachment and disinterestedness and its complete devotion to God but also will reinforce the spontaneous orientation and drive of intellect with a deliberate decision and a habitual determination.
Now this aid and support of the Agage of good will to the Eros of the mind is some type of hope. For the object of the will is the good. But the good of intellect is not any of its achievements but ever in prospect, for it is its desire is unrestricted and so its questions to not cease. tional operations. Still ...'
pt 701, par. Now such (ts 25): ts has a start, crossed out: `Now such a decision and determination of the will must have as its object the proper good of intellect. But the proper good of intellect is the saisfaction, in whatever manner may be possible, of its detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. And since that satisfaction and attainment are not a present or an easy good, they can be willed only as an object of the will's hope for the good that is distant and difficult. Finally, this hope will be confident, for the author of the solution is God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and goodness itself.
In the fifteenth place, there is to be considered the appropriate, relatively transcendent conjugate form that a realization of the solution would involve in man's intellect.
Now it is clear enough that the appropriate conjugate form would put man's intellect in possession of the essential truths regarding God's existence and nature and the solution God provides to man's problem of evil. Moreover, in so far as this conjugate form was itself a contribution to the solution, it would involve man in a commitment to the positions and in a rejection of the counter-positions. But it is less'
pt 702, par. This argument (ts 28): ts has a start, crossed out: `On second thoughts, one adverts to the distinction between questions for intelligence and questions for reflection. Man reaches truth and certitude inasmuch as he judges'
pt 704, par. But (ts 31): ts has `Now' for `But'
pt 705, l. 1 (ts 31): ts: `... and then published in tables of various kinds. As departments of mathematics multiply, it becomes apparent that no one can be an expert in all of them and it follows that every one is relying on the results obtained by others in branches with which he himself is not specially competent. published ...'
pt 706, l. - 3 (ts 34): ts: `a primitive ignorance in which man's mind would be defenceless against . But the ...'
pt 710, par. `The link' (ts 39-40): ts has a start, crossed out: `The link between the conditioned and its conditions is that there is such a value if someone else has grasped the unconditioned and has expressed it exactly and if what he expressed exactly has been communicated to me accurately. proposition as unconditioned and if proposition as unconditioned.
pt 710, par. `It remains' (ts 41): ts has a start, crossed out: `It remains that something be said on the preliminary judgments. While they contain theoretical elements such as the essential detachability and communicability of the unconditioned and the value of implementing this communicability in a human collaboration, they also contain concrete and particular elements that regard the reliability of a source and the accuracy of a communication.'
pt 711, l. - 12 (ts 42): ts: `is so constructed'; changed by hand in ms B
pt 711, l. - 3 (ts 42): ts: `will reveal'
pt 712, l. - 20 (ts 43): ts: `are involved'; also ms B
pt 712, l. - 17 (ts 43): ts: `was established'; also ms B
pt 713, l. 1 (ts 44): ts has `Still' for `None the less'
pt 713, l. 5 (ts 44): ts: `for avoiding all error'
pt 713, l. 7 (ts 44): ts has `their' for `his'; changed in B
pt 713, l. 17 (ts 44): ts: `of the precise proposition to be believed here and now. Such a question of fact goes beyond general presumptions proposition ...'
pt 715, par. In the first place (ts 48): ts has a start crossed out: `In the first place, the critique rests on an exact notion of belief. There exists a collaboration in the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge, and from the collaboration there follows a distinction between each individual's immanently generated judgments and, on the other hand, the assents he elicits in virtue of his dependence on the collaboration
there follows necessarily a distinction between the truths affirmed in virtue of immanently generated knowledge and, on the other hand, the truths affirmed in virtue
pursuit and dissemination of truth, and from the collaboration there follows necessarily a distinction between the propositions affirmed by any given individual in virtue of his own immanently generated knowledge and, on the other hand, the propositions he affirms in virtue of his participation in the collaboration. The latter propositions are objects of his belief; the former are objects of his knowledge, where knowledge is taken in a narrow sense that excludes belief.'
pt 716, l. 4 (ts 50): ts: `... indubitability. Not only is there no rational ground for rejecting beliefs that are true; but also there is no likelihood that all beliefs will be rejected
For the counsel leads to the rejection of all beliefs that, on superficial analysis, are known to be beliefs
For the counsel ...'
pt 716, l. 6 (ts 50): ts has `known' for `taken'; also in B
pt 717, l. 9 (ts 52): ts: `even offer a list of alternative lists, as the clothing industry offers a range of ready-made suits of different sizes; and it does not do so because it is a method and because the business of a method is not to predict results to facilitate
methodologist is to devise general procedures that can be adapted to every particular case.
a list ...'
pt 717, par. In the third place (ts 52): ts has two starts, crossed out:
`In the third place, though we have said that the method we offer is efficacious, we must hasten to add a word of explanation.
`In the third place, the claim that the method is efficacious must not be taken as a contradiction of the assertion that there is a problem of evil.'
718: the 'Logical Note' was much longer in ts. The changes to the form of the published text are not indicated in ts. It reads:
4.4 A Logical Note
The possibility and fact of belief enlarges the notion of truth to include not only the content of judgments resulting from reflective grasp of the unconditioned but also the content of assents that proceed proximately from decisions of the will and remotely from someone else's grasp of the unconditioned.
However, if this enlargement is overlooked, there arise a number of logical problems that have repercussions on the analysis of belief. It will be the purpose of the present subsection to indicate that such problems are merely logical and that they vanish when the notion of truth and, in particular, its enlargement are taken into account.
First, then, it will be objected that belief involves no enlargement. For whether one knows or believes, truth consists simply in affirming what is and in denying what is not while falsity consists simply in affirming what is not and in denying what is. The answer to the objection is to be had in noting that affirmation and denial are intrinsically rational acts, that they not merely regard an object but also occur because of an apprehended motive. Hence, while belief does not enlarge the range of objects of true affirmation, it does enlarge the range of true affirmations for it enables many to affirm truly what only a few may grasp as unconditioned.
Secondly, it may be objected that, in the analysis of belief, four of the alleged typical acts are superfluous. For once one knows that an expression has been communicated accurately from a really reliable source, one knows that it is true. Therefore, there is no need for the reflective act of understanding, for the judgment of value, for the decision of the will, and for the assent that is said to be an act of believing. The answer is to point out that the objection takes the counter-positions for granted. It supposes that truth and falsity are properties of expressions but, as has been seen, they are properties of intrinsically rational acts while expressions are merely adequate or inadequate. Hence, to know that an expression has been communicated accurately from a reliable source 1) is not to know that the expression is true, for truth is not a property of expressions, and 2) does not lead to knowledge of truth but solely to belief.
Thirdly, one may object that it leads not merely to belief but also to knowledge of truth. For it leads to the judgment on the value of deciding to believe; that judgment is not a belief, for it proceeds immediately from a grasp of the value as unconditioned; moreover, that value is neither sensible nor volitional but purely intellectual, and the purely intellectual value is truth. Therefore, the judgment of value is not belief but knowledge of value, and the value known is truth. Further, there follows the corollary that the decision to believe and the act named believing are superfluous.
The answer here calls for a distinction, for the argument may or may not be supposed to involve a misplaced abstraction. There is a misplaced abstraction if one supposes truths to be self-subsistent entities apart from intrinsically rational acts whose objects are true
The answer here calls for a distinction between a value in prospect and the same value as realized. The value envisaged in the judgment of value is a value in prospect, namely, the value of deciding to believe. Were the future act of belief
The fallacy here turns on the use of the name, knowledge. In a broad sense, one can say that a cognitional act is knowledge if its object is true; in that sense all true belief is an instance of knowledge. But in a strict sense one will say that a cognitional act is knowledge 1) if its object is true, and 2) if the cognitional act results immediately from a reflective grasp of the object as unconditioned; and, clearly, in this strict sense not even true belief is knowledge.
Now, in the third objection, it is argued that the judgment of value is not belief but knowledge, and then the name, knowledge, is employed in the strict sense. Later, however, it is argued that the value in question is a truth and, since the value is known, therefore the truth is known. Now it is in this argument that the ambiguity becomes operative. For knowledge of the value is knowledge in the strict sense. Knowledge that the value in question is the value of truth again is knowledge in the strict sense. But knowledge of the content or object, subsumed under the value of truth, is no more than knowledge in the broad sense. For it is knowledge that an act of believing, if it occurs, will be true; but even when the act of believing does occur, it will be no more than knowledge in the broad sense; and anticipatory knowledge of knowledge in a broad sense is knowledge of the anticipated content or object only in a broad sense.
Fourthly, it will be objected that at least the decision to believe and the act of believing are superfluous. For in the judgment of value there is implicit knowledge that the content of this anticipated assent of belief will be true. But, by adverting to the implication, one already knows all that one will know by believing. Therefore, at least for anyone aware of the implications of his acts, the decision to believe and the act of believing are superfluous.
The basic distinction overlooked by this objection is between the primary flow of consciousness, in which occurs the process of believing, and the secondary, introspective flow, in which occurs the analysis of the process of believing.
Now in the primary flow a judgment on the value of deciding to believe either is or is not superfluous. If it is superfluous, then the premise of the fourth objection vanishes along with the decision to believe and the act of believing. But if it is not superfluous, then the affirmation of the value of deciding motivates the will to decide and may even oblige it to decide; and if the will decides, then the act of believing follows with natural necessity. Moreover, if one grants the judgment of value to be superfluous, then one is committing oneself to the counter-positions; for one will be driven to conceive truth, not as a property of intrinsically rational acts (veritas logica formaliter est in solo iudicio), but as a property of expressions or, perhaps, as some self-subsistent entity to be known by taking a look.
It is in the secondary, introspective flow of consciousness that there occurs the advertence to the implication that, if the judgment of value is true, then the assent of belief will be true. But though the implication exists and the advertence may occur, they do not render superfluous either the decision to believe or the act of believing. For the introspective flow of consciousness either is confined to knowing or else it goes beyond knowing to become a principle of action. If it is confined to knowing, then its sole function is to report accurately what occurs in the primary flow; and the accurate report is that the decision to believe and the act of believing are not superfluous but normal elements in the collaboration of men in the pursuit of truth. On the other hand, if the introspective flow of consciousness is supposed to be a principle of action, so that man knows himself in order that he may reconstruct his procedures, then at least the reconstruction has to be coherent and reasonable. But it would be incoherent to posit a judgment on the value of deciding to believe and, at the same time, exclude the decision and the believing. And a will that consistently failed to respond to affirmative judgments of value would not be good and reasonable but bad and unreasonable. Finally, while the reader may feel that he could work out a coherent and reasonable reconstruction that modified the actual process of belief, he also will acknowledge that his reconstruction would remain a mere theory, quite irrelevant to the analysis of belief, until believers commonly proceeded along the new lines laid down for them.
pt 719, l. - 6 (ts 60): ts: `in the pursuit of truth will be reinforced by hope and motivated by charity
of truth will rectify previous aberrations of man's intellect and provide a bulwark against their recrudescence.
of truth will provide ...'
pt 720, l. 13 (ts 61): ts: `universally accessible, and it is belief that is universally accessible; indeed, within a harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe, it is belief alone that is unive
accessible, yet ...'
pt 720, par. In the twentieth place (ts 62): ts has two starts, crossed out:
In the twentieth place, at least in the full solution,
In the twentieth place, since faith is transcendent belief within a new and higher collaboration, the act of faith will be an assent of intellect to an object and because of a motive. The motive will be the omniscience, goodness, and omnipotence of God, who is the initiator and the principal agent in the collaboration. The object will be the truths communicated through the collaboration. The possibility of applying this motive to the object is that, in some fashion, divine omniscience, goodness, and omnipotence is, in fact, the responsible author and the efficacious guardian of the truths transmitted through the collaboration. The possibiity of the reasonableness of a faith with such an object and because of such a motive is'
pt 724, l. 1 (ts 67): ts had `restrained' for `intelligently controlled'; changed by hand
pt 724, l. - 20 (ts 68): ts has only `undreamed', not `undreamed of'
pt 727, par. But (ts 72): ts has a start, crossed out: `But while any type of solution would be accepted by some and rejected by others, while its intellectual collaboration would develop down the ages, while the faith and hope and charity of its successive members more commonly would hover about some essential minimum than reach maxima of intensity and efficacy,'
pt 727, l. 14 (ts 73): ts has `a believing' (twice); changed by hand in B
pt 727, l. 17 (ts 74): ts has `God above all'; changed in B
pt 727, l. - 14 (ts 73): ts has start on sentence, crossed out: `Imperfect hope can combine a confident anticipation of a personal intellectual bliss with a remarkable detachment from the intellectual interests'
pt 728, par. At the same time is run into preceding in ts.
730, par. The task (ts 77): ts has a start, crossed out: `For some the task of identifying the solution will be extremely simple; for others it will be fraught with difficulties. Nor is the caue of this difference hard to find, for it is a necessary consequence of the existence of the problem or error and sin'
pt 730, end: ts: `and by infusing the charity, the dispassionate, unrelenting ardor for truth and being
dispassionate, unrelenting at-oneness-with
dispassionate, unrelenting at-oneness with all the truth, the real, the good, that outlasts the fire-ball of the atom bomb and immeasurably exceeds its power to change the living of man.'