Archival Number: A480 V89
Author: Lonergan, B.
2 handwritten schematic pp. on relation of perception and judgment, in context of an article by James Collins. Fifth item in Batch V, folder 8, System & History
Database and descriptions © Copyright 2017 by Robert M. Doran
Transcription by Robert M. Doran
Does it include or exclude true judgment?
include; art. in Revue thomiste, cited by J. Collins
If it excludes, then perception is
either A experience & intelligence (without judgment)
or B experience without intelligence and without judgment
If A rudderless cf Scheler
If B animal
Obj: does not include intelligence or judgment
but it does include α Scotus and Ockham’s
intellectual intuition of existing and present qua existing and present
β or some less clear-headed equivalent.
Resp: such an intuition α does not exist,
β is superfluous,
γ is merely a necessary conclusion
from fact of knowledge
and refusal to consider facts of knowledge
Obj: (exp and insight) qua true though not reflectively known to be true
Resp: = essentialism
judgment as not constitutive element in knowledge
If perception is supposed to include true judgment
does the word ‘perception’ add anything to the
properties of this totality of true judgments?
If it adds nothing, then my position.
If it adds the reference to a real object
it expresses the conviction that knowing is
not essentially = perfection
not radically an identity in act of knower and known
but essentially a duality of knower and known.
Then (1) Neoplatonist vs. Arist
(2) Aq. I, 14, 2
(3) Scotus – formal distinction
(4) Deduction of Verbum divinum (Günther, Rosmini)
Dices ratione in Deo distinguuntur Deus cognoscens et Deus cognitus
ratione vera N, falsa C