MiT XI fragments 746
Archival Number: A746
Author: Lonergan, B.
38 pp. headed `MiT XI.' Numbered 1-18, with some numbers repeated. 2: `... theology arises from a differentiation in religious consciousness, and methodology arises from a differentiation in theological consciousness.' 2-3: `... the methodological viewpoint [i]n no way ... [implies] that the methodologist is indifferent to doctrinal issues. On the contrary, it reveals a highly effective devotion to the solution of such issues. In the past a summary devotion to doctrines has only prolonged disunion. If, in the future, dissident communions employ a common method, if they acknowledge that the radical issue lies in religious, moral, and intellectual conversion, then at least there will exist a dynamic reaching through authenticity to union.' See 3 (3rd) re `method' helping Xtian unity because neutral; yet not entirely neutral, because philosophically presupposes intellectual & moral conversion and takes stand on them, and theologically presumes `religious conversion can and does occur. The method, then, does presuppose a theological doctrine about grace and conversion. But this presupposition lies, not in the use of the method, but in an account of the method. It does not lie in the use of the method, for there what counts is the fact of conversion, the new man with a new self to understand, a new understanding of himself, and a new horizon within which to understand the past. It does lie in an account of the method, for in such an account one has to explain why it is that the method can and will lead to a sound theology.' 8:`... systematic thinking ... can achieve continuity without rigidity only if it is based on interiority.' Material around p. 11 indicates something (very little) on teaching office in church. 20: `No doubt, there is much evil in the modern world, but that only means that Xtianity has a great redemptive task to undertake. No doubt, there is much relativism in modern thought, but that only means that the error of relativism has to be clearly and accurately stated. Relativism is not mistaken when it rejects immutable propositions. Relativism is mistaken when it does not acknowledge that a principle is a first in an ordered set, that besides propositional principles there are real principles, that the real principles of change in human affairs are man's attentiveness, his intelligence, his reasonableness, his responsibility, that these real principles develop indeed but ever remain normative for human authenticity.'
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